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WHO DECIDES CONSCIENCE?
RFRA’S CATCH-22
Priscilla J. Smith*
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines application of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in cases challenging the contraception
coverage rules under the Affordable Care Act.1 I will discuss a
problem with the application of RFRA’s statutorily mandated
strict scrutiny test in this context that has not received attention—
* Director, Program for the Study of Reproductive Justice, Information
Society Project, Yale Law School. Thanks to the speakers and panelists at the
symposium, Religious Freedom and Equality: An International Look, held at
Brooklyn Law School in 2013. Thanks to Brooklyn Law School, its Dean,
faculty and staff for hosting the symposium, to those whose generous support
for the conference made it possible, and to Louise Melling, who was the
primary organizer of the event. For comments on previous versions of this
essay that have greatly improved it, thanks are due to Jack Balkin and the ISP
fellows, especially Andrew Tutt and Kara Loewentheil. For sharing their
thoughts about religion and a commitment to social justice, thanks are due to
Robert M. Pennoyer, Rev. John F. Smith, and James Carroll. Finally, I am
also extremely grateful to David Giller and Florence Mao for their excellent
editorial guidance and suggestions.
1
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2012). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the
Supreme Court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to state
laws. It remains applicable to federal laws, like the Affordable Care Act. See
also, e.g., O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that RFRA is a valid exercise of congressional authority under the
necessary and proper clause); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th
Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001);
Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998).
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a problem I’ll call the RFRA Catch-22. The Court first
confronted the identical Catch-22 in Employment Division v.
Smith,2 a case I discuss in detail below, when it attempted to
apply strict scrutiny to the constitutional free exercise claims of
Native Americans whose ceremonial peyote use was proscribed
by state law.3 On the one hand, the Court recognized that the
First Amendment prohibits judicial review of the “centrality” of
conduct to an individual’s religion, the “relative merits of
differing religious claims,” or “the determin[ation] of the place of
a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious
claim.”4 On the other hand, “[d]ispensing with a ‘centrality’
inquiry is utterly unworkable,” said the Court.5 It would require
courts to grant all claims, and to equate burdens on throwing rice
at church weddings to burdens on getting married in church,6 or,
more relevant to today’s cases, the “burden” of having one’s
employees covered by insurance that includes coverage for
contraception with the “burden” of being forced to use
contraception oneself. Faced with this Catch-22, this choice
between an all or nothing approach to free exercise claims
seeking
accommodation
from
generally
applicable
nondiscriminatory laws, in Smith the Court chose nothing, and
rejected application of the strict scrutiny test to claims under the
Free Exercise Clause. The Court wrote, “[t]he government’s
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of
2

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. The plaintiffs in Smith were denied unemployment compensation
benefits for “misconduct” when they violated the state’s drug laws by using
peyote. Id.
4
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87 (“Nor is it possible to limit the impact of
respondents’ proposal by requiring a ‘compelling state interest’ only when the
conduct prohibited is ‘central’ to the individual’s religion. [A]s we reaffirmed
only last Term, ‘[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’
interpretations of those creeds.’” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
5
Id. at 887 n.4.
3

6

Id.
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public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual
development.’”7
Under RFRA, however, courts are again required to apply the
strict scrutiny test in challenges to federal government conduct
claimed to burden “religious exercise,”8 requiring precisely the
sort of judicial measurement of religious tenets and impact on
spiritual matters that the Smith Court recognized are precluded by
the Establishment Clause.9 Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court
will have to grapple with this familiar Catch-22 as it considers the
expansive interpretations of “religious exercise” and “substantial
burden” under RFRA promoted by the plaintiffs in Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius10 and Sebelius v. Hobby
Lobby Stores,11 challenges to the contraceptive coverage rules
being heard by the Court this term. As Georgetown Law
Professor Marty Lederman’s detailed writings revealing the
7

Id. at 885 (internal quotation marks omitted).

8

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012).
See infra Part II; Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (equating evaluation of
centrality with, inter alia, substantiality, discussing “unacceptable ‘business of
evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims,’” and citing Justice
Stevens’ warning in United States v. Lee that this type of judicial evaluation of
religious tenets would create “the risk that governmental approval of some and
disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one religion over another”
(citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring))); id. at 889 n.5, 887 n.4. See also Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking
9

the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice
and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 122–23 (1997) (noting that RFRA’s

substantial burden test “appear[s] to require courts to engage in the kind of
investigation into religious beliefs that Supreme Court Justices have
increasingly and nearly uniformly rejected”).
10
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Conestoga Wood Specialities
Corp. v. Sebelius, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/conestoga-wood-specialties-corp-v-sebelius/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014)
(list of briefs filed for this case).
11
723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (list of briefs
filed for this case).
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minimal burden on Hobby Lobby Executives’ religious exercise
establish,12 in order to find for Hobby Lobby the Court would
have to adopt a broad hands-off view of RFRA’s protections.
Under this view, it is the RFRA claimant, not the court, who
decides if something is a “substantial burden” on “religious
exercise” under RFRA. This broad interpretation was articulated
clearly by counsel for the University of Notre Dame in a recent
oral argument in a related case in the Seventh Circuit in which
counsel stated that it is enough if Notre Dame believes something
is a “substantial burden” under RFRA. As counsel argued, “[i]t
is up to the believer to draw the line.”13
I won’t hide my views of these broad claims. Better to
confess them now. If the Court upholds the plaintiffs’ RFRA
claims and the broad hands-off interpretation of “religious
exercise” and “substantial burden” they necessitate, rather than
finding a way to limit RFRA’s scope constitutionally to deny
accommodations in these cases,14 RFRA will have no
boundaries.15 A broad RFRA, read as the Court must read it—and
to read it fairly and in accordance with the Establishment
Clause—will mean a vastly different society, but that’s not
necessarily a bad thing. If I were confident that the courts would
12
13

See infra note 22.
See, e.g., Oral Argument at 27:23, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius,
Cir. argued Feb. 12, 2014) (No. 13-3853), available at

(7th
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2014/rs.13-3853.13-3853_02_12_2014.
mp3 [hereinafter Notre Dame Oral Argument]. This case involves the even
more fantastical claim that even invoking a statutorily-granted accommodation
from the contraceptive coverage requirements for non-profit religious
institutions, who self-certify, was a “substantial burden.” See infra notes 109–
10 and accompanying text.
14
I discuss possible narrowing techniques below. See infra Part III.
15
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (“The rule respondents favor would open
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory military
service, . . . to the payment of taxes, . . . [to] manslaughter and child neglect
laws, . . . compulsory vaccination laws . . . drug laws, [to] environmental
protection laws, . . . and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the
races.”).
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in fact review RFRA claims equitably, showing equal respect to
all claims of religious exercise, I could allow myself to see a
silver lining in a dark cloud—one that could be brought to bear in
challenges to numerous federal laws under the aegis of federal
RFRA. The broad interpretation of “religious exercise” and
“substantial burden” being promoted in these cases could even be
persuasive in challenges brought under state versions of RFRA
that prohibit state restrictions that “substantially burden”
“religious exercise.” Defined as broadly as the plaintiffs in these
contraceptive coverage challenges advocate, requiring a hands-off
judicial approach to evaluating burdens, RFRA’s protections
could mean a new birth of freedom—freedom from draconian
limits on reproductive choice, limits on sexual expression, limits
on drug possession and drug use, requirements of service on
juries, requirements that certain taxes be paid and census
questions answered, and limitations on who and how many one
may marry.
Unfortunately, though, I am not confident of the courts’
ability to apply a broad RFRA fairly. In rejecting strict scrutiny
in Smith, the Court admitted that it cannot apply the unbounded
strict scrutiny test equitably or in a manner in accordance with the
Establishment Clause. Dueling opinions of two panels of the
Seventh Circuit—one insisting on judicial evaluation of the
“substantiality” of burden and the other limiting review of
“substantiality” drastically—confirm this view.16
By reimposing the strict scrutiny test rejected in Smith,
Congress has put the Court into the same untenable position it
faced in Smith. The Court can choose “nothing” again, insisting
that conducting these determinations is beyond the “judicial ken.”
The Notre Dame panel rejected the broad hands-off view, but another
panel of the Seventh Circuit appears to endorse it. Compare Notre Dame v.
Sebelius, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 21 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (noting that
“substantiality . . . is for the court to decide”), with Korte v. Sebelius, 735
F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that “substantial burden inquiry” must
be limited to the evaluation of “the coercive effect of the government
pressure” to act against beliefs). See also infra notes 109–19 and
accompanying text.
16
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It could choose “all,” deferring to the plaintiffs’ characterization
of religious “exercise” and the “substantiality” of burden, as
Notre Dame’s counsel urged. Or it could, as I expect it to, claim
to be evaluating the substantiality of the burden in this case but in
practice conduct no real evaluation at all, ignoring its earlier
warnings about the discriminatory results that have occurred
under this standard and are likely to occur again in the future.
Thus, the most likely result is a broad and protective RFRA for
some, those with religious exercise claims with which judges are
most familiar, and a weak RFRA for the rest of us.
In Part I below, I will outline the relevant RFRA standards
and ACA requirements, and briefly discuss arguments made by
others that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause on its face,
or alternatively, that RFRA would be unconstitutional “as
applied” if applied to grant accommodations in Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood. In Part II, I will discuss judicial review of free
exercise claims, explain the Catch-22 the Court faced in
Employment Division v. Smith, how RFRA creates the same
Catch-22, and how the breadth of the claims in Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood traps the Court in the Catch-22. Finally, in
Part III, I will suggest two ways for the Court to limit RFRA and
avoid the Catch-22 at least in these cases, and then close with a
discussion of the ramifications of granting accommodations in
these cases, either by granting all accommodations requested
under RFRA or by conducting only a perfunctory examination of
“substantial burden.”
I. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

AND

THE

The question of how to balance competing claims of religious
conscience and equality mandates imposed by secular authority is
currently being played out most prominently in the ongoing battle
over the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).17 The ACA requires
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, amended by
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 [hereinafter ACA]. See also Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
17
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employers with fifty or more employees, who are not otherwise
exempt from the Act’s requirements,18 to provide their employees
with a minimum level of health insurance or pay an assessment to
the Internal Revenue Service.19 Nonexempt group plans must
provide coverage without cost-sharing for preventive care and
screening for women20 that includes “[a]ll Food and Drug
Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with
reproductive capacity.”21 Notably, employers do not have to pay
for contraception themselves because contraception is a costsaving preventive service and is therefore routinely offered at no
additional cost. Moreover, as Professor Lederman has explained
in detail, although this provision of the law has been widely
described as a contraception “mandate,” this term is a misnomer,
both because of the numerous accommodations and exemptions
from the requirements granted by statute and regulation to
religious institutions and nonprofit organizations, and because the
statute also provides objectors with a way to avoid the
contraception coverage requirements altogether.22 If these entities
724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) (“ACA requires non-exempt group plans to
provide coverage without cost-sharing for preventative care and screening for
women in accordance with guidelines created by the Health Resources and
Services Administration (‘HRSA’), a sub-agency of HHS.”).
18
The ACA provides broad exemptions for religious institutions and
nonprofit organizations who self-certify that they oppose providing
contraception. In such circumstances, health plans will provide the coverage
without the involvement of the employer. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 147.131
(2012).
19
Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 381.
20
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2012)).
21
Id. (quoting 77 C.F.R. 8725 (2012)).
22
Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III: There Is No “Employer
Mandate,”
BALKINIZATION
(Dec.
16,
2013,
9:36
AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iiitheres-noemployer.html [hereinafter Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III] (citing 26
U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012), which provides that a large employer must make
an “assessable payment” to the IRS if it chooses not to offer its full-time
employees participation in an employer-sponsored health insurance plan);
Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III-A: Does Federal Law Substantially
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object to providing the health insurance package outlined in the
Affordable Care Act, they can choose not to provide health
insurance and instead pay an assessment to the IRS.23
Despite this alternative, numerous cases have been filed
throughout the country challenging the requirement in different
postures.24 In March 2014, the Court heard arguments in two of
those cases, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores,25 and Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius,26 both of which involve
objections of for-profit businesses to the contraceptive coverage
requirement of the ACA. In Hobby Lobby, the plaintiff is a forprofit corporation that claims the contraceptive coverage
requirements violate the corporation’s right to religious exercise
Pressure Employers to Offer Health Insurance Coverage in Violation of
Religious Obligations, Even Though There is No “Employer Mandate”? ,
BALKINIZATION (Dec. 28, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iii-adoes-federal-law.html [hereinafter Lederman,
Hobby Lobby Part III-A]. See also, e.g., Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part
I – Framing the Issues, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:28 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-i-framing-issues.html
[hereinafter Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part I]; Marty Lederman, Not Quite
Hobby Lobby: The Nonprofit Cases, and Opting Out as Complicity,
BALKINIZATION (Jan. 1, 2014, 5:24 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/01/
not-quite-hobby-lobby-nonprofit-cases.html [hereinafter Lederman, Not Quite
Hobby Lobby] (explaining cases involving plaintiffs who object to the
procedures for making use of the exemptions granted to nonprofit
organizations).
23
For a full description of the alternative to providing a plan with the
required services and its implications, see Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III-A,
supra note 22.
24
For updates on these cases, see Challenges to the Federal Contraceptive
Coverage Rule, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/reproductivefreedom/challenges
-federal-contraceptive-coverage-rule (last updated Mar. 13, 2014).
25
723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (list of briefs
filed for this case).
26
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Conestoga Wood Specialities
Corp. v. Sebelius, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/conestoga-wood-specialties-corp-v-sebelius/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014)
(list of briefs filed for this case).
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under RFRA because of the religious objections of the
corporation’s owners.27 In Conestoga Wood, the Plaintiffs include
the individual “religious owners” of the “family business” as well
as the for-profit corporation itself. They assert the claims of the
individuals and the for-profit corporation under both RFRA,28 as
well as the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.29
It is extremely unlikely that the Court will consider the free
exercise claim in Conestoga Wood because the standard
applicable to constitutional free exercise claims is lower than the
RFRA standard.30 This means that if the plaintiffs prevail on their
RFRA claims, there will be no need to look to the constitutional
claim; and if the plaintiffs lose their RFRA claim under an
application of RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard, it is “virtually
inconceivable” that they’d win under the less stringent Free
Exercise Clause claim, or even under a Free Exercise Clause
reinterpreted to require application of strict scrutiny.31 Therefore,
assuming the Court disregards, as have the lower courts,32 the
plaintiffs’ option to avoid the requirement to provide health
insurance that includes contraception by declining to offer any
health insurance at all, the Court will be faced with difficult
questions about how to evaluate the claims of conscience in these
cases. While much has been written about RFRA generally33 and
27

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
42 U.S. C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
29
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
30
In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court
rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review for reasons discussed more fully
below. See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
31
See, e.g., Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part I, supra note 22 (predicting
that “the constitutional question, as such, will consume only a tiny fraction of
the total briefing, and virtually none of the Court’s attention.”).
32
See Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III, supra note 22.
33
See, e.g., Caroline M. Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 1469 (2013) (contraception coverage requirement does not violate
Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause or the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act);
Caroline M. Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty
(Jan. 24, 2014) (manuscript at 3 n.22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
28
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the contraceptive mandate challenges in particular,34 one issue
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384963
[hereinafter
Corbin,
Corporate
Religious Liberty] (citing numerous articles discussing whether corporations
are protected under RFRA); Caroline M. Corbin & Steven D. Smith, Debate:
The Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom, 161 U. PENN L. REV.
ONLINE
(June
14,
2013),
http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/
index.php?id=48 [hereinafter Corbin & Smith, Debate] (debating status of
contraceptive coverage requirement under RFRA and arguing that corporations
are not eligible “persons” under RFRA); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Protecting Without Favoring Religiously Motivated
Conduct, 2 NEXUS J. OP. 103 (1997) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager,
Protecting Without Favoring]; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is
Unconstitutional]; Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA

Exemptions From the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014); Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme
Court: The Justices, The Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse , 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1671 (2011) [hereinafter Hamilton, Smith at the Supreme Court];
Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (1998) [hereinafter
Hamilton, Religious Freedom Restoration Act]; Kara Loewentheil, When Free
Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation
Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433 (2014).
34

I will not discuss here, but will refer the interested reader to, excellent
literature analyzing claims that the contraceptive coverage requirements violate
the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, or RFRA under current
doctrine. For example, Caroline Corbin has written a series of articles
outlining many flaws in the arguments of those who claim their free exercise
rights are violated by the contraceptive coverage requirements. See, e.g.,
Caroline M. Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1469
(2013) (contraception coverage requirement does not violate Free Exercise
Clause, the Free Speech Clause, or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act);
id. at 1477 (citing Zelman v. Simmon-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
(availability of federal funds to religious schools through voucher programs
was too indirect to create Establishment Clause problem)) (pointing out that
any “burden” of providing health insurance that includes coverage for
contraception is not “substantial” because it is so “indirect”); Corbin & Smith,
Debate, supra note 33 (debating status of contraceptive coverage requirement
under RFRA and arguing that corporations are not eligible “persons” under
RFRA). For the argument that for-profit corporations are not “persons” under
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that has not received attention is the impact that the Court’s
analysis in Smith35 should have on its method of review of the
contraceptive coverage challenges brought under RFRA and the
potential Catch-22 that the RFRA revives.

A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Response to
Employment Division v. Smith

RFRA was enacted in 1993 with broad bipartisan support in
response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.36 In Smith, the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws
to the use of peyote during the religious ceremony of Native
Americans and, therefore, the state could deny claimants
unemployment compensation for work-related “misconduct”
based on their use of the drug. In rejecting the free exercise
claims of the Native Americans, the Court also rejected the strict
scrutiny standard it had previously claimed was applicable to free
exercise claims,37 writing:
To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a
law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his
religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest
RFRA, see generally Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, supra note 33
(citing articles on the subject).
35
494 U.S. 872 (1990). But see Levine, supra note 9, at 122–23 (noting
that RFRA’s substantial burden test “appear[s] to require courts to engage in
the kind of investigation into religious beliefs that Supreme Court Justices have
increasingly and nearly uniformly rejected”).
36
494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a description of the bipartisan movement to
enact RFRA as a response to Smith, see, for example, Eisgruber & Sager,
Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33, at 438–41.
37
In Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33,
at 446–47, the authors argue that in rejecting the strict scrutiny standard, Smith
was actually just bringing doctrine in line with past results. While in other
constitutional areas the compelling state interest test has been “‘strict’ in theory
and fatal in fact,” in the pre-Smith religious exemption cases, they point out
that the test was “strict in theory but feeble in fact.” Id. (noting the Court had
only applied the test to mandate accommodations from generally applicable
laws in the unemployment compensation cases and Yoder).
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is “compelling”—permitting him, by virtue of his
beliefs, “to become a law unto himself”—
contradicts both constitutional tradition and
common sense.38
As a result, the Court held that “if prohibiting the exercise of
religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of
the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended.”39
Reflecting a concern that the decision in Smith put religious
exercise at risk, Congress enacted RFRA and reinstituted the
strict scrutiny standard.40 RFRA requires that “[g]overnment shall
not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless “it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”41 But while some who supported RFRA
may have been motivated by a reaction to the Court’s
inconsistency in and seemingly discriminatory pattern with which
the Court had applied the Free Exercise doctrine generally—and
by the rejection of a “minority” religious claim in Smith in
particular—enactment of RFRA simply reimposed the standard
the courts had applied inconsistently in the past.42 Moreover,
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 167 (1878)).
39
Id. at 878.
40
Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33, at
438 (describing “self-congratulatory hoopla” from both sides of the aisle that
accompanied enactment of RFRA).
41
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (emphasis added).
42
Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting an
accommodation from compulsory school-attendance laws to Amish parents
who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school and
discussing the Amish’s generally civilized behavior); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (granting Seventh Day Adventist an exemption from laws
requiring her to make herself available to work on a Saturday), with Dep’t of
Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting application of the
38
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RFRA did nothing to solve the Catch-22 at the heart of the
jurisprudence that led the Court to walk away from the strict
scrutiny standard in Smith.

B. RFRA—Unconstitutional on its Face?
Law Professors Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager43
have argued that RFRA is unconstitutional on its face because it
improperly privileges religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.44 This argument has been presented to the Court in an
amicus brief filed on behalf of the Freedom from Religion
Foundation and others.45 Justice Stevens adopted this view in his
concurrence in City of Boerne v. Flores,46 where he argued that
RFRA required granting an exemption from a generally
applicable neutral civil law to religious practice, something that
no atheist or agnostic could obtain, thus establishing a
governmental preference for religion that is forbidden by the First

Sherbert test to peyote ban that prevented Native Americans from performing a
religious ritual that was widely acknowledged to be central to their religious
practice); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (sustaining,
without mentioning the Sherbert test, a prison’s refusal to excuse Muslim
inmates from work requirements to attend worship services); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting application of the Sherbert test to
military dress regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulkes).
43
Professor Eisgruber was a Professor of Law at NYU Law School, and
is currently the President of Princeton University. News at Princeton,
PRINCETON UNIV. (Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.princeton.edu/main/
news/archive/S36/65/54C75/index.xml?section=featured. Lawrence Sager is
Professor of Law at University of Texas School of Law. See UT Law Faculty
– Lawrence Sager, UT LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/sagerl/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2014).
44
See Eisgruber & Sager, Protecting Without Favoring, supra note 33;
Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33.
45
Brief of the Freedom for Religion Foundation et al., Sebelius v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2014), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Hamilton-briefHobby-Lobby.pdf.
46
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Amendment.47 Other than Justice Stevens though, no other Justice
was persuaded by the argument, or even commented on it, in
Boerne. Moreover, in Cutter v. Wilkinson,48 the Court explicitly
rejected a facial Establishment Clause challenge to a law quite
similar to RFRA, section 3 of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”). That statute
mandates application of the RFRA strict scrutiny standard to
patients or inmates confined to a federal institution.49 In Cutter,
state officials mounted a facial challenge to RLUIPA under the
Establishment Clause after prisoners who were members of
nontraditional religions claimed that their rights were violated
under the Act. The Court held that while “[a]t some point,
accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of
religion,’”50 section 3 of RLUIPA did not cross this line.51
There are certainly ways to distinguish Cutter and the
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–55 (1985)).
48
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
49
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (providing in part:
“[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
a person residing in or confined to an institution,” unless the burden furthers
“a compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive
means”) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 (providing “(a) [g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability [unless] . . . (b) . . . it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest”). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (preventing
implementation of land use regulation in a manner that “imposes a substantial
burden on . . . religious exercise,” unless the government demonstrates that
the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is
the least restrictive means” of furthering that interest).
50
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714 (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987)).
51
Id. The Sixth Circuit had agreed with the state officials, holding that
RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause on its face because it
“impermissibly advances religion by giving greater protection to religious
rights than to other constitutionally protected rights . . . .” Id. at 709
(discussing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003)).
47
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RLUIPA from RFRA that could support a holding that RFRA
violates the Establishment Clause in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood, despite Cutter. First, and most obviously, RLUIPA is
much “less sweeping” than RFRA. It targets two specific areas,
land-use regulation and religious exercise by institutionalized
persons, while RFRA is a seemingly unlimited mandate to
privilege religious exercise over nonreligious conduct, and in
Cutter, the Court emphasizes RLUIPA’s targeted nature.52 The
Court made much of Congress’s extensive documentation in
hearings spanning three years of the specific problems of
institutionalized persons and the “frivolous or arbitrary,”
“egregious and unnecessary” barriers to their religious exercise
that they faced that could limit its holding to the narrow situation
of institutionalized persons.53
Second, the Cutter decision is quite narrow in other ways.
The Court has recognized that the Free Exercise Clause “requires
governmental respect for, and noninterference with, the religious
beliefs and practices of our Nation’s people.”54 In upholding
Id. at 715, 720–21 (“Section 3 covers state-run institutions—mental
hospitals, prisons, and the like . . . .”); see also id. at 722 (citing appropriate
accommodation of religion in military context where it did not interfere with
“military duties”).
53
Id. at 716 (noting that “[b]efore enacting [section] 3, Congress
documented, in hearings spanning three years, that . . . ‘some institutions
restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary ways’”) (quoting 146
Cong. Rec. 16698, 16699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch and Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy on RLUIPA)).
54
Id. at 719. See also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (noting that the First Amendment
“gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations”). While some
saw the Court’s recent decision in Hosanna—agreeing with Lutheran Church
that application of employment discrimination statutes to its choice of
“minister” violated the First Amendment and approving the judicially created
“ministerial” exemption from state and federal employment discrimination
prohibitions for religious institutions—as a sign of the Court’s deference to
religion claims, the case is quite limited in ways that diminish its precedential
value as a skipper guiding our course here.
First, the Court acknowledges in Hosanna-Tabor the special status of the
“ministerial exception” granted to religious institutions in constitutional law,
52
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RLUIPA, though, the Court treads carefully, navigating a narrow
path between the “conflicting pressures” of the Free Exercise and
the Establishment Clauses.55 As the Court explained in Hosanna
Tabor, the Religion Clauses must be interpreted in concert to
both protect against government action that promotes the
majority’s favored brand of religion (Establishment Clause) and
government action that impedes religious practices not favored by
the majority (Free Exercise Clause).56 On the one hand, if
legislatures and judges were precluded by the Establishment
Clause from adopting or granting, respectively, exemptions from
and that the exception survived Smith as a self-contained, rarely invoked,
narrow exception, much like Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792–94
(1983) (finding that “the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer
has become part of the fabric of our society,” and holding that selection of a
Presbyterian minister for 16 years who is paid from the public fisc and whose
prayers are only in the Judeo-Christian tradition, does not in itself conflict with
the Establishment Clause, absent proof that his reappointment stemmed from
an impermissible motive). Moreover, in Hosanna-Tabor, rather than exerting
competing pressures—the Free Exercise Clause pressing proaccommodation
and the Establishment Clause pressing antiaccommodation—both clauses
pressed towards accommodation.
While recognizing that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation was a valid
and neutral law of general applicability like the prohibition on peyote use at
issue in Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, the Court distinguished the two
cases, noting that a “church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s
ingestion of peyote.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707. Regulation of
“physical acts,” like the use of drugs, is unlike review of selection of ministers
which would have involved “government interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and the mission of the church itself,” which is an
Establishment Clause no-no akin to “‘lend[ing Government] power to one or
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.’” Id. at 707
(quoting Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
55
Id. at 719–20 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; Corp. of Presiding Bishop
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329–30
(1987) (approving federal exemption for religious organizations from Title
VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination)) (noting that the Religion Clauses
are “cast in absolute terms,” and “if expanded to a logical extreme, would
tend to clash with each other”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S.
664, 668–69 (1970)).
56
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 730.
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generally applicable laws at least in some circumstances, then
much of the protection the Free Exercise Clause is designed to
provide—the “special solicitude” to religious practice it
endorses57—could be nullified by generally applicable laws that
proscribe religious practices. The danger to religious exercise
rights would be particularly acute in the institutions whose
inhabitants RLUIPA was designed to protect. In those contexts,
“government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian
society and severely disabling to private religious exercise.”58 On
the other hand, this ability to grant accommodations in honor of
the Free Exercise guarantees has never been, nor should it be,
unlimited, lest the accommodations tilt too far into Establishment
Clause territory.59
In Cutter, the Court stressed three important aspects of
RLUIPA that established it, at least in a facial challenge, as a
permissive legislative accommodation that fits between the Scylla
and Charybdis60 of the Religion Clauses, demonstrating solicitude
See id. at 706 (noting that the First Amendment “gives special
solicitude to the rights of religious organizations”). Surely, though privileging
of individual religions or the privileging of religion over non-religion is not
allowed, some solicitude to religious exercise is required. Smith, 494 U.S. at
890 (“[A] society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious
belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation . . . .”).
58
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 720–21.
59
Even proaccommodationist Michael McConnell argues for “rigorous
limitations” on accommodations. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
685, 687–88 (1992) (“[A]ccommodations are . . . sometimes required and,
within rigorous limitations . . . are always permitted. That does not mean, of
course, that every benefit to religion masquerading as an accommodation is
constitutional, but it does mean that the principle of accommodation, when
properly applied, is consistent with the requirements of the Religion Clauses.”
(emphasis added)).
60
In Greek mythology, Scylla and Charybdis were two monsters living on
either side of the waterway between Italy and Sicily. Scylla was a six-headed
beast who was said to eat ships and their sailors, while Charybdis was a
whirlpool who would suck the boats and men down into
her watery abyss. Scylla and Charybdis, MYTH ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.
mythencyclopedia.com/Sa-Sp/Scylla-and-Charybdis.html. Ships rarely made it
57
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to religious exercise, an appropriate protection of religious
freedom, rather than an inappropriate privileging of religion.
First, to be permissive, an accommodation must “alleviate[]
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise.”61 A legislative act that protects religious expression by
removing government-imposed burdens rather than creating
privilege where no burden existed is more likely to be perceived
as “an accommodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a
Government endorsement of religion.”62 As a response to burdens
imposed in government-run institutions, RLUIPA met this part of
the test.
Second, courts must be satisfied that the permissive
accommodation will be “administered neutrally among different
faiths.”63 Noting there was no reason on the face of RLUIPA to
believe that it would not be applied neutrally, the Court found
this second aspect of the test satisfied.64 Third, in evaluating
accommodations, the Court noted that courts “must take adequate
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose
on non-beneficiaries,” and, in granting an accommodation, courts
must not “override other significant interests.”65 The Court held
that RLUIPA must be applied so as not to elevate accommodation
of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain
order and safety, and so found this third aspect of the permissive
accommodation test satisfied as well.
RFRA is expected to survive on its face, not least because the
government has not pressed a facial challenge.66 It is, after all, a
between the two unscathed. Id.
61
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
62
Id. (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987)).
63
Id. (citing Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994)) (statute that created special school district for one
religious enclave and excluded all others violated the Establishment Clause).
64
Cf. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S at 705.
65
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. For further discussion of “significant
interests” that must be considered, see Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 33.
66
See, e.g., id. (arguing that “it is likely that RFRA facially complies
with the Establishment Clause”). But see Hamilton, Religious Freedom
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legislative accommodation that allows plaintiffs of all religions to
seek relief from a government imposed burden, and thus seems to
meet the first, and perhaps the second, part of the test that the
Court lays out in Cutter. However, the third criterion should
create problems when analyzing whether RFRA is constitutional
as applied to the case of contraceptive coverage requirements as
discussed next.

C. RFRA—Unconstitutional As Applied to For-Profit
Employers Seeking an Accommodation from the
Contraceptive Coverage Requirements
Applying RFRA to grant accommodations from the
contraceptive coverage requirements to for-profit employers, as
requested in the two cases before the Court, is constitutionally
problematic because it would not “take adequate account of the
burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,” and thus would “override other significant
interests”67 in violation of the Court’s limitations on permissive
accommodations set out in Cutter. Professors Gedicks and Van
Tassell argue that Establishment Clause doctrine prohibits
“accommodations that shift the costs of an accommodated
religion from those who practice it to those who don’t.”68 As they
note,
employees who do not share their employer’s
Restoration Act, supra note 33.
67
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
68
See Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 33. Professors Gedicks and Van
Tassel argue, “Neither courts nor commentators seem aware that a line of
permissive-accommodation prohibits shifting of material costs of
accommodating anticontraception beliefs from the employers who hold them to
the employees who do not. The impermissibility of cost-shifting under the
Establishment Clause is a threshold doctrine whose application is logically
prior to all of the RFRA issues on which the courts are now focused.” Id. This
argument is before the Court in the form of an amicus brief. See Brief for
Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks et al., Sebelius
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Nos. 13-354 and 13-356, 2014 WL 333891
(U.S. Jan. 27, 2014).
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anticontraception beliefs would be denied their
statutory
and
regulatory
entitlement
to
contraception coverage without cost sharing, and
thus would be directly saddled with material costs
they would not incur in the absence of the
exemption. Employees and their families would be
deprived of the benefits of the Mandate to which
they are otherwise legally entitled. The RFRA
exemption would require that they pay the out-ofpocket expense of contraceptives and related
services that they ought to receive at no expense
beyond their monthly health care insurance
premium. This is a direct burden that would not
exist without the permissive accommodation of
RFRA exemption.69
Applying RFRA to grant exemptions from the mandate in the
cases before the Supreme Court, the authors argue, would exceed
the
Establishment
Clause’s
“limits
on
permissive
accommodation.”70 Drawing from current doctrine, Gedicks and
Van Tassell suggest a limitation on the right to free exercise that
ends where the rights of nonadherents begin.
Kara Loewentheil takes this argument one step further.71 Like
Gedicks and Van Tassell, she focuses on Cutter’s third limitation,
the requirement that the courts consider the impact of
accommodations on third parties. She argues that the current
doctrine applicable to religious accommodation claims, under
Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 33, at 47–48 (noting that “[t]he
externalized cost will be material for most employees. Effective oral
contraceptive drugs cost between $180 and $960 per year, depending on the
drug prescribed and the area of the country where the prescription is filled”).
70
Id. Yet, another “as-applied” Establishment Clause problem would
arise if the RFRA was not “administered neutrally among different faiths.” See
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. For example, if courts granted accommodations
under the RFRA for one religion, like Christian practices for example, but for
few or no others, one could argue that this mosaic of accommodations added
up to a preference for Christianity over other religions in violation of the
Establishment Clause. See id.
71
See Loewentheil, supra note 33.
69
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both the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, is ill-suited to cases—like the contraceptive coverage
requirement cases—in which the “primary conflict lies between
different sets of non-state rights-holders: specifically religious
objectors and existing rights-holders whose interests or rights
would be negatively impacted (or completely blocked) by a grant
of religious accommodation to an objector, particularly when
such [existing rights-holders] have equality-implicating rights at
stake.”72 For these cases, Loewentheil argues, a framework is
needed that would “vindicate[e] the purpose of religious
accommodation rights [while also] protecting [existing rightsholders] from the negative impact of accommodations.”73 While
Loewentheil argues that “current doctrine can be argued to
obliquely support an emphasis on the[] interests” of existing
rights holders, she also proposes “a framework that places a
positive obligation on the state to respect all the substantial rights
involved when possible—and that prioritizes equality-implicating
rights when not possible.”74 If the Supreme Court is brave enough
in the Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby cases to deny the
exemptions, an unlikely but vaguely possible outcome,75 the
72
73
74

Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.

If the Court’s recent action in Little Sisters of the Poor is any
indication, the Court is intent on avoiding any serious examination of these
issues. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, No. 13A691,
2014 WL 272207 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2014). In Little Sisters of the Poor, the
plaintiffs were eligible for a statutory exemption from the contraceptive
coverage requirement. Nonetheless, they filed suit against the requirement and
refused to comply with the administrative procedures created to notify the
government and the insurance companies that they were eligible for the
exemption, complaining that doing so would enable the insurance companies to
provide the coverage on its own, thus making Little Sisters complicit in
someone else’s sin. The Court simply created a different administrative
mechanism that required the plaintiffs to inform the government in writing that
they qualified for the exemption, relieved them of the responsibility of filling
out the government form, and required the government to inform the insurance
company on behalf of the objectors. Filling out the government form and
sending that form to the insurance companies was apparently a “substantial
75
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Court is most likely to deny them based on the harm to third
party interests under either the Gedicks/Van Tassell or
Loewentheil framework.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
There remains a larger question at issue about the nature of
“religious exercise” for which legislatures and courts are granting
exemptions, a question that Loewentheil has pointed out is “a
neglected and under-theorized area in accommodation law, with
no satisfactory framework yet advanced.”76 Although this general
question has always been at the heart of the Court’s difficulty and
inconsistency in evaluating free exercise claims, as well as claims
under RFRA, no one has adequately grappled with the specific
question of when something constitutes an “exercise” of religion.
This inquiry—including an inquiry into the “substantiality” of a
burden on religious exercise required under RFRA—if it is to be
meaningful, requires that questions be asked about the nature of
the religious practice at issue, about what has been termed the
“centrality” of a practice to religious belief. The problem for the
courts is that these inquiries are precluded by Establishment
Clause principles. Without examining the nature of religious
“exercise,” however, there can be no meaningful limitation on
what can be claimed as religious exercise. Unless some other
limitation on RFRA claims is adopted, such as the requirement
that third party interests not be harmed, there will be no
burden” under the RFRA, but informing the government in writing of the
same information and having the government inform the insurance companies
was not. Of course, all this was done at the preliminary injunction stage and so
“should not be construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits.”

Id.

Loewentheil, supra note 33, at 451 n.89. See also, e.g., Eisgruber &
Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33. Cf. Edward Whelan,
The HHS Contraception Mandate v. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2179, 2182 (2012) (claiming that “there can be no
serious dispute that a person engages in an ‘exercise of religions . . . when, for
religious reasons, he performs, or abstains from performing, certain
actions’”).
76
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limitation on what must be accommodated using the strict
scrutiny test required by RFRA. This is exactly the Catch-22 the
Court found itself in in Smith.

A. Smith’s Catch-22
The First Amendment’s free exercise doctrine has always
struggled with questions about the nature of religious exercise
that should be protected, with miserable results that tend to
undermine the mandate for religious equality embodied in the
Religion Clauses.77 The ultimate problem with application of
strict scrutiny to free exercise claims, such as the ones in Smith,
Conestoga Wood, and Hobby Lobby, is the difficulty of
governing a society where a claim that a law interfered with one’s
religious exercise mandates, almost automatically, that the person
be granted an exemption from that law.78 By demanding the
highest standard of review—requiring that governmental actions
that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by
a compelling governmental interest79—the strict scrutiny standard
creates a presumption of invalidity for any regulation of conduct
that is claimed to interfere with religious exercise.80 The Smith
Court recognized that in the past it had applied the strict scrutiny
standard—and thus the presumption of invalidity—inconsistently,
striking down regulations in the face of complaints in very limited
circumstances, without limiting the standard’s reach in the
context of religion in any principled way. The reason it should be
impossible to turn down a claim under strict scrutiny? Because of
the First Amendment’s separate prohibition on judicial review of
the “centrality” of conduct to an individual’s religion, the
“relative merits of differing religious claims,” or “the
determin[ation] of the place of a particular belief in a religion or
77
78
79
80

See Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
See id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
Id. at 888 (“We cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively

invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that
does not protect an interest of the highest order.” (emphasis in original)).
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the plausibility of a religious claim.”81 As the Court notes in
Smith:
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine
the “centrality” of religious beliefs before applying
a “compelling interest” test in the free exercise
field, than it would be for them to determine the
“importance” of ideas before applying the
“compelling interest” test in the free speech field. 82
In support of its position that courts must not examine the
centrality of religious belief, the Court in Smith cites a string of
cases grounding the prohibition against judicial scrutiny of
centrality of religious belief in the First Amendment and, in one
case, specifically in the Establishment Clause.83 The Court cites
Id. at 887, 886 (“Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents’
proposal by requiring a ‘compelling state interest’ only when the conduct
prohibited is ‘central’ to the individual’s religion.”).
82
Id. at 886–88.
83
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–88 (citing Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680,
699 (1989)) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’
interpretations of those creeds. We do, however, have doubts whether the
alleged burden imposed by the deduction disallowance on the Scientologists’
practices is a substantial one.”); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981) (“One can, of course, imagine an asserted
claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to
protection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and
the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all
of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not
within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the
petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their
common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”);
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (refusing to conduct inquiry “to determine
matters at the very core of a religion—the interpretation of particular church
doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion,” because
“[p]lainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a
role”); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (noting that “the First
Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in
resolving church property disputes . . . . Most importantly, the First
81
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footnote number two of Justice Stevens’s concurrence in United
States v. Lee in which Justice Stevens explained that the principal
reason for avoiding this inquiry
is the overriding interest in keeping the
government—whether it be the legislature or the
courts—out of the business of evaluating the
relative merits of differing religious claims. The
risk that governmental approval of some and
disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring
one religion over another is an important risk the
Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.84
Because the Establishment Clause precludes the Court from
reviewing the validity of a claim of religious interference, if a
compelling interest test was to be applied, it must be applied
across the board, to all actions claimed to be religiously
commanded. This is different, as the Court seemed to be
admitting, from how the Court had applied the compelling
interest test piecemeal, read discriminatorily, in the past. The
Court then listed a number of important statutes, such as
manslaughter and child-abuse statutes, from which exemptions
could be sought. Importantly, the purpose of this list was not to
suggest that the courts would necessarily grant exemptions from
these eminently reasonable statutes, but to point out that denial of
any of these exemptions would require denial of all exemptions.
Any grant of one exemption but not another put the Court in
violation of the Establishment Clause because it risked that the
Court was itself comparing the weight of the burden on one
person’s religious belief as against the weight of the burden on
Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on
the basis of religious doctrine and practice”); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“We do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents’
religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. Whatever
this particular indictment might require, the First Amendment precludes such a
course, as the United States seems to concede. ‘The law knows no heresy, and
is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.’”).
84
Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Smith,
494 U.S. at 887 (discussing the “unacceptable ‘business of evaluating the
relative merits of differing religious claims’”).
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another person’s religious belief, a comparison that required
prohibited inquiry into the centrality of a practice under religious
law.85
Thus, the real problem that the Court faced in Smith is the
impossibility of evaluating the extent of a burden on religious
exercise without inquiring into the “centrality” of the religious
belief being claimed.86 In Smith, Justice Scalia writing for the
Court recognized the Catch-22 that this created. On the one hand,
courts cannot inquire into centrality because of the risk of
creating a widespread perception of favoritism that will lead to
internecine conflicts between individuals of different faiths and
faith traditions. On the other hand, “[d]ispensing with a
‘centrality’ inquiry is utterly unworkable.”87 As Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court:
[i]t would require, . . . the same degree of
“compelling state interest” to impede the practice
of throwing rice at church weddings as to impede
the practice of getting married in church. There is
no way out of the difficulty that, if general laws
are to be subjected to a “religious practice”
exception, both the importance of the law at issue
and the centrality of the practice at issue must
reasonably be considered.”88
As the Court in Smith recognized, if strict scrutiny is indeed
to be applied, “it must be applied across the board, to all actions
thought to be religiously commanded.”89 This is to say it must be
applied consistently and fairly. But “if ‘compelling interest’ really

Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (listing compulsory military service,
payment of taxes, manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory
vaccination laws, traffic laws, minimum wage legislation, child-labor and
animal-cruelty laws, laws protecting the environment, and equality of
opportunity for the races).
86
Id. at 886–87.
87
Id. at 887 n.4.
88
Id. (emphasis in original).
89
Id. at 888.
85
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means what it says, . . . many laws will not meet the test.”90 In
Smith, the Court was distressed at the prospect of applying a real
strict scrutiny test91 that would require courts to grant
accommodations from all sorts of “reasonable” laws, such as
laws prohibiting drug use to laws prohibiting murder and
mayhem, all in the service of religious belief. In the face of this
crisis, the Court throws up its hands and passes the buck to the
legislature. Categorically unable to adjudicate such claims in a
manner that does not create the appearance of establishing some
religions as favored and some as disfavored, the Court in Smith
concluded it was proscribed from deciding whose claims to
individual religious exemptions were valid and whose were
invalid under the Free Exercise Clause by independent
counterforce embodied in the Establishment Clause.92
The Justices struggle with their inability to review religious
practice to determine the scope of Free Exercise claims
throughout the opinions in Smith. However, while swearing off
such inquiries in writing, in practice the Courts have been unable
to resist making these determinations in Free Exercise cases. For
example, Justice O’Connor in her concurrence repeats the
Court’s constant refrain that “it is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith,”93 and states that the determination of the constitutionality
90
91

Id.
Id. (noting that because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of

people of almost every conceivable religious preference,” the compelling
interest standard would require exemptions “from civic obligations of every
conceivable kind” (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961))).
92
This is not a wholly unusual situation in Constitutional law. The Court
has held that the Constitution’s commitment to equality means that raceconscious measures to remedy racially-disparate impacts must also be narrowly
circumscribed to avoid embroiling courts in a process of enacting the very
inequality they seek to remedy. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Courts are limited in their powers to enjoin and limit speech to protect the
privacy of individuals in legal proceedings lest they themselves violate the
First Amendment, even though privacy is generally regarded as itself protected
by the First Amendment at least to some extent.
93
Smith, 494 U.S. at 906 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal
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of the ban on peyote use “cannot, and should not, turn on the
centrality of the particular religious practice at issue.”94 On the
other hand, Justice O’Connor proposes,
the sounder approach—the approach more
consistent with our role as judges to decide each
case on its individual merits—is to apply [the
compelling state interest test] in each case to
determine whether the burden on the specific
plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant
and whether the particular criminal interest
asserted by the State before us is compelling.95
Justice O’Connor would allow the courts to make factual
findings “as to whether a claimant holds a sincerely held religious
belief that conflicts with, and thus is burdened by, the challenged
law.”96 Admitting that “[t]he distinction between the question of
centrality and questions of sincerity and burden” is “fine,” Justice
O’Connor nonetheless insists that “it is one that is an established
part of our Free Exercise doctrine, and one that courts are
capable of making.”97 She then determines that the prohibition of
peyote places a severe burden on the respondents’ religious
practice, and that the state has a compelling interest in controlling
use of illegal drugs.98 Finally, while claiming she is not
questioning the centrality of the peyote use to the church, Justice
O’Connor appears to do just that, questioning whether the
claimant holds a “sincerely held religious belief that conflicts
with, and thus is burdened by, the challenged law.”99
Justice Blackmun writing in dissent similarly demonstrates the
problem with review of the sincerity of religious belief or the
Revenue., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94
Id. at 906–07.
95
Id. at 899.
96
Id. at 907.
97
Id. (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S.
290, 303–05 (1985); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–88 (1944)).
98
Id. at 903–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing scholarly work on
Peyote Religion).
99
Id. at 907.
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centrality of a belief to religious practice. Justice Blackmun, like
Justice O’Connor, applied strict scrutiny, but weighed the
importance of the peyote ritual differently than Justice O’Connor
and so would have granted an exemption from the peyote ban.100
Like the other Justices, Blackmun begins by agreeing that “courts
should refrain from delving into questions whether, as a matter of
religious doctrine, a particular practice is ‘central’ to the
religion.”101 He goes on, though, to advocate that courts do just
that, citing to Yoder’s determination that “education is
inseparable from and a part of the basic tenets of the [Amish]
religion . . . [, just as] baptism, the confessional, or a Sabbath
may be for others,” noting “I do not think this means that the
courts must turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State’s
restrictions on the adherents of a minority religion.”102 He then
finds that “[w]ithout peyote, [the Respondents] could not enact
the essential ritual of their religion.”103
Justice Scalia writing for the Court explicitly rejects the
approaches of both Justice O’Connor and Justice Blackman. In
response to Justice O’Connor, he dismisses the “fine” distinction
between judicial review of the centrality of religious belief and
review of the “significance” of a burden, noting that
“‘[c]onstitutionally significant burden’ would seem to be
‘centrality’ under another name.”104 To Justice Blackmun he
similarly replies that there is no difference between inquiry into
“severe impact” and inquiry into “centrality” of a religious belief
and notes that Blackmun’s evaluation of the impact of the peyote
ban demonstrates this fact. Justice Scalia declares that Justice
Blackmun “has merely substituted for the question ‘How
100
101
102
103

Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919–20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing a brief filed by the

Association on American Indian Affairs et al., a scholarly history of the peyote
religion, and a popular mystery novel by Tony Hillerman, describing ritual in
which the “sacrament Peyote is the means for communicating with the Great
Spirit”).
104
Id. at 887 n.4 (majority opinion).
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important is X to the religious adherent?’ the question ‘How great
will be the harm to the religious adherent if X is taken away?’
There is no material difference.”105
It is into Smith’s breach that Congress—emboldened by
support from left, right, and middle—inserted RFRA, leaving the
Court in the untenable position of reviewing the “substantiality”
of the burden on “religious exercise,” the inquiry the Court
rejected in Smith as precluded by the Establishment Clause.106
Under RFRA, Congress demands the “horrible” result the Court
decried in Smith, mandating that “federal judges will regularly
balance against the importance of general laws the significance of
religious practice.”107

B. Breadth of the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Claims
One could argue that there are cases that would not require
the Court to evaluate the significance of certain behaviors and
their importance to religious practice in a way that implicates the
concerns articulated in Smith. For example, challenges to laws
that so obviously burden clear and well-established rules of a
given religion, such as a law that prevents a person from
becoming a minister to her chosen congregation, a law that
prevents a person from using the sacramental wine, a law that
prevents a person from using peyote in a religious ceremony,
these might not test the court or require it to evaluate religious
doctrine in a threatening way. These all seem obviously
burdensome in a substantial way, even though the last was not
105
106

Id.

It could be argued that “substantiality” of a burden is a different
inquiry than “centrality” of a burdened religious belief, but determining the
extent of a burden requires an interpretation of the importance of a burdened
practice to one’s overall religious life. This sort of judicial review of doctrine
creates the risk of an appearance of impartiality with which the Smith Court
was concerned.
107
Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5. See Levine, supra note 9, at 122–23
(noting that RFRA’s substantial burden test “appear[s] to require courts to
engage in the kind of investigation into religious beliefs that Supreme Court
Justices have increasingly and nearly uniformly rejected”).
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obvious to the Court in Smith. One could argue that because these
laws directly contradict central aspects of the actual ceremonial
“celebration” of religion, the courts can avoid the Catch-22
because they need not enter into a prohibited area of review to
hold that these laws violate RFRA.
But in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood the claims are
more complicated. These plaintiffs are not claiming that how
they celebrate their religion is burdened. Rather, they claim that
by offering plans that include the means to obtain contraception,
they are somehow complicit in what they see as the sin of the
person who chooses to use contraception, even if the person who
uses the contraception does not see it as a sin, and indeed, even if
the person who uses contraception sees it as religiously mandated.
They argue that their “religious exercise” will be “substantially
burden[ed]” under RFRA if the insurance plans provided to their
employees include contraceptives as part of a package of
preventive services, even if the employer does not pay anything
for the contraception, and even though the employee’s choice to
use or not use contraception stands between the employer and the
employee’s alleged “sin.” Furthermore, they claim this chain of
causation between sin and employer is not broken in this
circumstance, but that it is broken where the employee uses other
financial benefits they receive from their employers, i.e., salary,
to pay for contraception. Moreover, the plaintiffs in Hobby
Lobby make this claim even though the health insurance plans
they offered before the ACA required contraceptives to be
covered, covered contraception. Hobby Lobby only dropped
coverage for contraceptives when federal law required coverage,
a fact that should lead the Court to question the substantiality of
the burden imposed.108 The breadth of these claims puts the Court
squarely in forbidden waters.
This Catch-22 came to a head recently in the oral argument
and subsequent decision in Notre Dame v. Sebelius, a case which
involves the more “fantastic” claim that even requiring Notre
See Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2013)
(questioning sincerity of the plaintiff’s claimed religious belief); see also infra
note 124.
108
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Dame to invoke the statutory exemption granted under ACA from
the contraception coverage requirements violates RFRA.109 As
Notre Dame’s counsel stated, if Notre Dame believes it is a
substantial burden on its religious exercise to even apply for the
accommodation, the court must grant an accommodation from
applying for the accommodation, no questions asked: “It is up to
the believer to draw the line.”110
109

Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 20 (7th
Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (“What makes this case and others like it involving the
contraception exemption paradoxical and virtually unprecedented is that the
beneficiaries of the religious exemption are claiming that the exemption
process itself imposes a substantial burden on their religious faiths.”).
110
See, e.g., Notre Dame Oral Argument 27:23, supra note 13. The full
colloquy went as follows:
Judge Hamilton: We have a long history in this country of
accommodating religious faith in various ways that are not
required by free exercise or prohibited by the Establishment
Clause, there’s some play in the joints, we know . . . . Can
you point me to any other example in our legal history where
the accommodation itself has been challenged as a burden on
free exercise?
Mr. Kairys: You mean other accommodations?
This
mandate is new.
Judge Hamilton: This mandate is new, yes, I’m trying to
understand though . . . .
Mr. Kairys: I cannot your honor . . . .
Judge Hamilton: [h]ow complying with minimal . . . I mean,
to provide an accommodation at all requires at least some
minimal invocation, say “yes I want to take advantage of the
accommodation.”
Mr. Kairys: Right, but it is up to the believer to draw that
line. And Notre Dame has made that religious determination
and Korte says it is not for you to engage in this issue of
minimal or not minimal.
Judge Hamilton: It sounds like what you are telling us is that
the entire U.S. Code then is subject to strict scrutiny any
time somebody raises a sincere religious objection.
Id.; see also id. at 18:50 (where counsel for Notre Dame argues that under
RFRA, “It is not for the Court to determine what is ‘meaningful’ or what’s
‘insignificant.’ [Notre Dame has] made their own religious determination that
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The Notre Dame panel rejected this position, holding that the
burden of invoking a statutory exemption was minimal, and that
though “Notre Dame may consider the process a substantial
burden, but substantiality—like compelling governmental
interest—is for the court to decide.”111 Notably, though, the
court escaped the Catch-22 because the minimal nature of the
burden claimed made the claim practically ridiculous in its eyes.
The court distinguished a different Seventh Circuit case, Korte v.
Sebelius,112 in which the panel had an opposite reaction to the
RFRA Catch-22,113 taking the hands-off approach in the more
difficult case of two individual owners of a for-profit business
that was not entitled to the statutory exemption, and who, like the
plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, sought an
accommodation under RFRA. In Korte,114 the panel upheld the
plaintiffs’ RFRA claims, and contradicting the Smith Court’s
determination, wrote:
[i]mportantly, the substantial-burden inquiry does
not invite the court to determine the centrality of
the religious practice to the adherent’s faith; RFRA
is explicit about that. And free-exercise doctrine
makes it clear that the test for substantial burden
does not ask whether the claimant has correctly
interpreted his religious obligations. Indeed, that
inquiry is prohibited . . . . It is enough that the
the role required of it from signing the form to maintaining a contractual
relationship [violates its religious tenets.]”).
111
Notre Dame, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 21. The Court held that the
paperwork burden is “the opposite of cumbersome,” id. at 13, and while
expressing skepticism of the second burden, the “triggering” burden, by
writing “[t]hat seems a fantastic suggestion,” id. at 18, the court ultimately
finds it unconvincing as a factual matter, id. at 15 (“Notre Dame’s signing the
form no more ‘triggers’ Meritain’s obligation to provide contraceptive services
than a tortfeasor’s declaring bankruptcy ‘triggers’ his co-tortfeasors’ joint and
several liability for damages.”).
112
735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013).
113
Notre Dame, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 21 (distinguishing Korte, 735
F.3d at 654).
114
Korte, 735 F.3d at 654.
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claimant has an “honest conviction” that what the
government is requiring, prohibiting, or pressuring
him to do conflicts with his religion.115
The Korte panel attempted to draw a distinction between
“sincerity” and “religiosity,” both factual inquiries it claimed are
within the court’s authority and competence, and the “substantialburden” inquiry which the panel argues, along with the Tenth
Circuit, is “primarily” an evaluation of the “intensity of the
coercion applied by the government to act contrary to [religious]
beliefs.”116 By defining the substantial burden inquiry as an
evaluation of the “coercive effect of the governmental pressure on
the adherent’s religious practice,” as the adherent defines the
religious practice, Korte intends to steer the substantial burden
inquiry “well clear of deciding religious questions.”117 While the
Notre Dame panel declined to state its disagreement with the
Korte panel on this view of the substantial burden inquiry
explicitly, if the “coercive effect” of the government pressure
were the only issue, the result would have been the same in both
cases, because the penalty for failure to comply is the same.
Instead, in Notre Dame, the panel refuses to abdicate its role of
reviewing substantial burden, but it still appears to leave open the
possibility that abdication of judicial review of the burden must
occur where the question is harder.118 If the hands-off view of
judicial review of burden prevails under Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood, as it did in Korte, the courts’ role under RFRA
will simply be to decide whether the plaintiffs are forced to do
something they claim violates their religious beliefs, something
they oppose other people doing because it contrasts with their
moral beliefs as religious people. The courts will not be
conducting a meaningful review of whether or not the action
burdens, in any significant way, their exercise of religion. As
Judge Hamilton warns during oral argument in Notre Dame, “It
115
116
117
118

Id. at 683 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Notre Dame, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 21 (distinguishing Korte, 735

F.3d at 654).
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sounds like what you are telling us is that the entire U.S. Code
then is subject to strict scrutiny any time somebody raises a
sincere religious objection.”119
III. AVOIDING THE CATCH-22
The Court recently heard argument in Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood and may issue decisions before this essay goes
to print. I conclude here by discussing three possible outcomes of
these cases.

A. Limiting RFRA
There are two ways the Court in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood could limit RFRA to avoid the Catch-22 altogether. First,
the Court could recognize that accommodations may not be
granted in these cases, because the harm to third parties is too
great, under either the Gedicks/Van Tassell or the Loewentheil
theory.120 If the Court adopts this approach, it will not be called
upon to address the substantiality of the burden on religious
exercise under RFRA. Second, the Court could interpret
“religious exercise” under RFRA strictly to mean only those
actions that constitute religious “practice.” Limiting “religious
exercise” to actions such as, for example, celebrating religion or
wearing religious garb identifying one’s religious affiliation,
would allow the Court to avoid the issue in this case because the
attenuated claims of harm here would not qualify as this type of
religious exercise.121

119
120
121

Notre Dame Oral Argument at 27:23, supra note 13.
See supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,

132 S.Ct. 694, 711–12 (2012) (“The First Amendment protects the freedom of
religious groups to engage in certain key religious activities, including the
conducting of worship services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as
well as the critical process of communicating the faith.”) (Alito and Kagan,
JJ., concurring).
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B. Choosing “All” or Choosing “Some”

If the Court does consider the merits of the claims here, it
strays into the area of considering claims for exemptions from
secular mandates because the mandates prevent someone from
living one’s life “in accordance with one’s religious belief.”
Consideration of such claims leads the Court into the dangerous
waters between Scylla and Charybdis. Either the Court will
choose “all,” accepting at face value any claim that a secular rule
conflicts with a religious belief, or it will choose “some,” and
evaluate whether being tangentially involved in giving a third
party the freedom to act or not act in a way that would conflict
with one’s own religious belief is itself in violation of the
plaintiff’s religious belief.
The Court could agree with the Korte panel and the position
of the University of Notre Dame and hold that it is the believer
who draws the line. It may be that the Court will distinguish
RFRA’s requirement that the Court conduct a review of the
substantiality of a burden and the same inquiry conducted under
the Free Exercise Clause, based on the former being a
legislatively mandated review while the latter was a judicially
created standard. The Court could then conduct a perfunctory
review of “substantial burden,” applying a very limited inquiry
into the burden the attenuated claims place on the plaintiffs in
these cases. It is also possible that the Court will hold that the
connection here between government action and religious exercise
is simply too attenuated to amount to a substantial burden on
religious exercise.
In any case, application of RFRA’s standard to allow forprofit businesses an exemption from the ACA contraceptive
coverage requirement, like application of the strict scrutiny
standard to free exercise claims under the Constitution, would, as
the Court warned in Smith:
open the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind—ranging from
compulsory military service, . . . to the payment
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of taxes . . . to health and safety regulation such as
manslaughter and child neglect laws, . . .
compulsory vaccination laws, . . . , drug
laws, . . ., and traffic laws . . .; to social welfare
legislation such as minimum wage laws, . . . ,
child labor laws, . . . , animal cruelty laws, . . .
environmental protection laws, . . . and laws
providing for equality of opportunity for the
races, . . . .122
Given that many think the Court will grant the exemptions in
this case, we should prepare ourselves to use RFRA to enforce
equal protection for our own religious freedom, and to challenge
restrictions on actions mandated by our consciences in our
relationships with our own “divinities.” Courts have rejected the
claims of the Church of Marijuana,123 but the claims of many
religious people, for example, religious people who were
integrally involved in the movement for reproductive freedoms in
the 1960s and 1970s will not be so easily sloughed off.
Moreover, if the Court grants the exemptions in these cases, any
attempt to deny claims brought under RFRA by those whose
religious beliefs lead them to choose abortions or contraceptives,
or those whose religious beliefs mandate they make abortions or
contraceptives available to others, would be an unconstitutional
application of RFRA under the Establishment Clause. We await
the Court’s move.
CONCLUSION
I am not optimistic that the Court will follow these
suggestions. In defending the contraceptive coverage
requirements, the federal government has been extremely reticent
to criticize RFRA from what I imagine is a political desire to
avoid seeming hostile to any religious claims. They have
122

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990) (citations omitted).
United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996)
(denying RFRA claim of adherent of the Church of Marijuana as espousing a
philosophy and/or way of life rather than a “religion”).
123
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studiously avoided questioning the sincerity of religious beliefs
and tried to avoid anything that would entangle the Court in
questioning the claimed burdens on religious exercise. The
government has done this despite ample evidence in this and other
challenges to the contraceptive mandates that these claims are
being made only as part of a broader objection to federal power,
and/or as an effort to prevent women from accessing
contraception.124 Nor has anyone questioned Catholic plaintiffs’
In its recent decision in Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626
(8th Cir. 2013), the Eighth Circuit questioned the sincerity of the plaintiff’s
claimed religious belief. The court notes that the plaintiff Michael Potter, a
Roman Catholic, claims that he
follows the teachings of the Catholic Church, and has
“deeply held religious beliefs” “that prevent him from
participating in, paying for, training others to engage in, or
otherwise
supporting
contraception,
abortion,
and
abortifacients.” In fact, Potter claims that “these procedures
almost always involve immoral and unnatural practices.”
Id. at 629. The court then notes in a footnote:
Interestingly, in a conversation with salon.com’s Irin
Carmon, Potter’s “deeply held religious beliefs,” more
resembled a laissez-faire, anti-government screed. Potter
stated to Carmon, “I’ve got more interest in good quality
long underwear than I have in birth control pills.” Carmon
then asked the Eden Foods chairman why he didn’t seem to
care about birth control when he had taken the step to file a
lawsuit over the contraceptive mandate. Potter responded,
“Because I’m a man, number one[,] and it’s really none of
my business what women do.” The article continued: So,
then, why bother suing? “Because I don’t care if the federal
government is telling me to buy my employees Jack Daniel’s
or birth control. What gives them the right to tell me that I
have to do that? That’s my issue, that’s what I object to, and
that’s the beginning and end of the story.” He added, “I’m
not trying to get birth control out of Rite Aid or Wal-Mart,
but don’t tell me I gotta pay for it.”
Id. at 629 n.3 (citation omitted). Similarly, in the Hobby Lobby case, the
plaintiff’s “religious exercise” only became “substantially burdened” when the
federal government adopted the contraceptive coverage requirement. See, e.g.,
Jaime Fuller, Here’s What You Need to Know About the Hobby Lobby Case ,
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the124
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objections to providing access to all contraceptions despite the
approval by the Catholic Church of these medications when used
therapeutically, not as a form of contraceptive.125 In fact, unless
the Court follows the path recommended by Gedicks and Van
Tassell or Loewentheil in implementing an alternative limitation
on the grant of accommodations under RFRA, I suspect that the
Court will grant an accommodation in the contraception cases,
while refusing accommodations in future cases to those whose
religions are less palatable to them,126 like mine.127 This will
fix/wp/2014/03/24/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-hobby-lobby-case/.
Until that point, the health plans offered contraceptive coverage without
objection from the plaintiffs.
125
The Humanae Vitae, the document setting out the Roman Catholic
Church’s position on contraception, permits therapeutic uses of contraceptives
to treat organic diseases, even though they have a contraceptive effect. PAUL
VI, HUMANAE VITAE (1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html
(“On the other hand, the Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those
therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable
impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such
impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever.”).
126
See, e.g., Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1484 (denying RFRA claim of adherent
of the Church of Marijuana as espousing a philosophy and/or way of life rather
than a “religion.”).
127
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (“Men and
women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall
disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage); id. at 916 (“[a]s the joint opinion so
eloquently demonstrates, a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is
nothing less than a matter of conscience”) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also, e.g., Lawrence B. Finer, et al., Reasons U.S.
Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives , 37
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 110 (2005); Rachel K.
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produce exactly the Establishment Clause violation the Court
rejected in Smith and Justice Stevens warned against in Lee. If
this is the route the Court takes, it should expect that its religious
neutrality will be tested, and the religious underpinnings of civil
rights movements will rise again.
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5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/02/abortion_
as_end_of_life_care_why_i_chose_a_peaceful_life_and_death_for_my.html.

